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1.  Introduction
Access  to  land  is  of great  importance  for  household  welfare  for  a  number  of reasons  -ensuring  food
security,  providing  an  opportunity  to  make  productive  use  of  family  labor,  and  to  diversify  the
households'  activity portfolio-  especially  in environments  where other product  and insurance  markets are
imperfect  (de  Janvry  et  al.  2000).  Secure  property  rights  to  underpin  such  land  access  are  generally
considered to be a precondition  for economic growth  and development,  for three reasons,  namely (i) they
provide  the  incentives  necessary  for  owners  to  undertake  land-related  investments  thus  helping  to
maintain and  increase  sustainability  of resource  use  and  agricultural  productivity;  (ii)  they decrease  the
cost of transacting  land in the market,  thus helping to increase  allocative efficiency  in the economy;  and
(iii) availability of formal land title increases  credit supply by providing a basis for institutional lenders to
actually  foreclose  on a  property  in case of default (Besley  1995; Binswanger  et al.  1995;  Deininger and
Feder  1999). Although there is little disagreement  about the  importance of these factors at the conceptual
level,  their  relative  importance,  the  magnitude  and  distribution  of  potential  benefits  generated  by
exogenous  interventions  to increase  tenure  security  as compared  to  the cost of establishing  land  rights,
and the policy  implications  to be derived,  have been the subject of much debate  in the literature.  In  this
context,  three issues have been of particular  interest.
The first issue relates to the benefits  of more  secure  land tenure in an environment  where credit  markets
do not function well. Following the  seminal work by Feder et al.  (1986) in Thailand which found that the
benefits  from  land  titling  come  about  predominantly  through  a  credit  supply  effect,  interventions  to
provide  land regularization  and titling  are now routinely justified in terms  of the improved  credit access
they provide. However,  in the majority of the situations where the issue of public interventions  to enhance
land tenure  security  is  currently  under  discussion,  credit  markets  do not  function  well.  Use  of land  as
collateral  is  legally  prohibited  in  China  and  a  number  of  East  Asian  countries  (Cambodia,  Laos).
Foreclosure  is  difficult  if not impossible  in India  and  the Philippines.  In  many  African  countries,  low
population  densities and absence  of financial  infrastructure  imply that credit markets are underdeveloped
and  that  land  has  little  value  as  collateral.  In  fact,  a  number  of  studies  have  concluded  that  inenvironments  where, for institutional  or legal reasons,  credit is  not readily available  to agriculture,  there
may be  little justification  of public  interventions  to  increase  tenure  security  (Bruce  and Migot  Adholla
1994; Platteau  1996).  This leads to the question  whether,  in situations  where  credit is unlikely to be the
primary  channel  through  which titling  would  affect land use,  there may still  be other channels  through
which such an intervention will have an impact.
The  second  issue  relates  to  the  significance  of  land  title,  and  in  particular  the  potential  for reverse
causality whereby,  rather than increased tenure security (e.g. through award of title) causing investment, it
is  investment, for example in the form of tree planning,  that leads to higher levels  of tenure security. This
key argument  is  that land-related  investments  may themselves  be  a means of staking claim to  a plot of
land and thereby enhancing  the degree of tenure security (e.g. Sjaastad  and Bromley  1997, Brasselle et al
1997). This could explain  that possession of land title  many not be equivalent  to higher levels of tenure
security (Wachter,  1992). If it were true, land rights would be clearly  endogenous,  the returns to measures
that increased  security of land rights found in the literature  (Besley  1998; Alston et al.  1996; Lopez  1997;
Hayes  et al.  1997)  would  be  biased,  and contributions  that  are  more  skeptical  regarding  the  potential
impact  of titling (e.g. Jansen and Roquas  1998; Atwood 1990) might be correct.
Finally,  there  has been concern  regarding  the distributional  impact of land titling, an issue  that depends
largely on the channel through which the  main effect comes  about. If titling  improves credit access only,
it will likely be the better off who will be able to derive  economic  benefits from land titling (Carter and
Olinto 2000).  If, on the other hand, titling improves  tenure  security,  it may provide large benefits  to the
poor who,  without being  able to rely on a formal document that is enforced by the state,  are often forced
to spend  disproportionate  amounts  to counter  legal  challenges  to their  land ownership.  It  is well  known
that  the added  security of low-cost  measures  to  increase  tenure  security  is  much  sought  after (Firmin-
Sellers  and  Sellers  1999).  Nonetheless  access  to  land  provides  an important  safety  net in  the  face  of
incomplete food  markets (Burgess  1999).  Thus,  especially in cases where the number of land conflicts is
increasing  (e.g.  Andre and Platteau 1998; van Donge 1999), inability to discern a credit supply effect may
not imply  that  measures  to enhance  tenure  security -which  may  stop  short  of full-fledged  formal  title
would not be useful and appropriate  to enhance productivity  and overall economic  efficiency.  By possibly
precluding  them  from  using  family  labor,  the  one  resource  they  possess  in  abundance,  to  make
productivity-enhancing  investments  with  comparatively  high  economic  returns.  Evidence  on  an
investment response to titling, and in particular the extent to which such titling was able to target the poor,
could  thus be important  to  provide a justification  for  land titling  not only from  an efficiency-  but also
from an equity perspective.
2In  this  paper  we  use  the  example  of Nicaragua  to explore  these  issues.  Nicaragua  is  of interest  for  a
number of reasons.  First, in different phases of its  implementation, the titling program issued certificates
the legal  impact of which  was  quite different.  While initially  beneficiaries  received  only  a certificate  of
title,  subsequent  changes  resulted  in the  issuance of  a  legally  binding  registration.  Second,  titling was
undertaken  in the context of an intervention  targeted at all  agrarian reform beneficiaries  in a given  area,
thus being clearly exogenous  and alleviating concerns  that the  results of any  measurement  of the impact
may be affected  by endogeneity.  Third,  the data  available  allow us to apply  econometric  methodologies
that are  more appropriate than those that have often been used in the literature,  as discussed below.  Also,
in view of the general lack of rural financial infrastructure  and a restructuring  of the financial sector in the
second  half of the  1990s,  credit  supply  was  unlikely  to  be the  main route  through  which  more  secure
tenure  would affect  economic  outcomes.  With  a population  density of 30 inhabitants  per km2 (90 if the
Atlantic  coast  is  excluded)  Nicaragua  is  also  relatively  land  abundant.  Thus,  as  in  the  case  of  many
African  countries,  land values  as  well  as  the likelihood  to find  a  significant impact  of titling  on  credit
access  would be lower than in densely populated areas.
The paper  is structured  as follows.  Section two provides a  more  detailed review of the literature and the
conceptual background  underpinning  efforts  at  land regularization  as well  as  a brief account of the  land
tenure situation  in Nicaragua  and a description of the data underlying the analysis.  Section three discusses
the conceptual  framework and the equations  to be estimated  to make inferences  on the investment-effect
of  land  title,  the  potential  economic  impact  of  such  investment,  and  the  extent  to  which  land
regularization  increases  land  values  for  different  groups  in  the  population.  Section  four  discusses
empirical  results,  while  section  five  concludes  with  a  number  of  recommendations  for  research  and
policy.
2.  Legal environment, data, and descriptive statistics
The  impact  of  titling  interventions  can  not be  separated  from  the  legal  and  institutional  framework
prevailing  in a country.  Thus, any effort  at identifying  the impact of such a measure needs to build on an
understanding  of the historical  evolution of land relations,  the  way  in  which  titles  (or other documents)
were  awarded,  and  the legal  significance  of these certificates.  In this  section,  we  provide  this legal  and
historical  background  on the situation in Nicaragua  as well as the land titling intervention  to be analyzed
subsequently. We also describe  the sample to be used and discuss descriptive  statistics  concerning  socio-
econormic  characteristics  and agricultural productivity.
32.1  The legal  and policy environment
In  Nicaragua,  a  series  of commodity booms  in  coffee,  cotton,  and  meat,  together  with  a  set of policy
distortions that encouraged  the accumulation  of land,  gave, from the late  19t' century, rise to a systematic
process of land concentration  (e.g.  Paige  1997). This process was accentuated  by land acquisition through
A.  Somoza,  who  assumed  the  presidency  in  1936,  and  his  family.  The  Sandinista  revolution  in  1979
unseated  Somoza and distributed large tracts  of lands to former workers.  However,  during the Sandinista
period,  which  lasted from  1979 to  1990,  and especially  in  its final  phase,  the Govemment  distributed,
through its agrarian reform program, large amounts of land it did not legally own,  thereby laying the seed
for continuing insecurity in the sphere of property rights.
Following the  change of government  in  1990,  the door was  opened to  a flood of claims for restitution.
Even though various  laws aimed at  setting an end to the lodging  of new claims for restitution  by former
owners,  the issue has been re-opened repeatedly,  often shortly  after a supposedly  definitive  deadline for
closing  the books  had  lapsed.  As  a  result,  a  large  volume  of litigation  ensued  and tenure  security  was
undermined  not only for those  directly affected by land redistribution  but also for the remnainder  of land
owners  who had to live in constant fear of being subject to a claim to their land.  This is illustrated by the
fact that the total area currently  claimed for restitution is larger than Nicaragua's  total land area  (Merlet
and Pommier, 2000).
Distribution  of land  under  agrarian reform,  largely  to ex-combatants,  continued  under the  Government
that held office  in 1990-1996.  Although the lands  involved were largely  in frontier areas, it was often not
clear  whether  or  not previous  titles  to  the  land  had  existed.  This,  together  with transactions  of land
received through land reform,  further complicated the land tenure situation.  It was accompanied  by farm
invasions through  self-styled bands of "demobilized"  soldiers which were sometimes staged by indebted
large farmers  wanting  to avoid foreclosure.  There  is general  agreement  that,  in order to deal  with these
issues  and to  provide  the underpinning  for continued  economic  recovery  and  rural  growth,  improving
tenure  security  will  be  mandatory  from  a  productivity  and  an  equity  point  of  view.  In  fact,  the
Government's  poverty  reduction  strategy  highlights land  regularization  as one of the priority  actions  to
revive  economic  growth  and  improve  the  livelihood  of the  poor  (Government  of Nicaragua,  2000).
Nicaragua  also counts  with a very gender-sensitive  legislation  and, in order to ensure equal  treatment of
women, the administrative  requirement to issue title jointly to husband and wife.
The  importance  of these  issues  is  most  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  case  of cooperatives.  The  large
majority of these cooperatives  have long been  disbanded and defacto individualized.  However, inability
to  determine  whether  or  not  current  members  of  the  cooperatives  are  rightful  owners  of their  land,
together with an institutional and legal framework unable to resolve the issues, especially provision of the
4legally  required  documentation,  at  the  speed  required,  made  it  virtually  impossible  for  members  of
cooperatives  to  formally  make  the  de jure  transition  to  individual  land  ownership.  The  productive
inefficiency  of collectives  and the need to continue fighting legal battles for their land led to a precipitous
economic  decline of the  cooperative  sector and  a wave  of distress  sales  (Jonakin  1997), both  of which
affected  primarily  the poorest groups  in the population.  More  recent  case  studies also  illustrate  that the
poor spent  considerable  amounts of money or even had to sell  portions of their  lands to hire lawyers  to
defend their land claims in legal cases that were often of dubious nature (Merlet and Pommier, 2000).
To realize the benefits  associated from better definition  of property rights,  various  donors  have provided
resources  for clarification  of the legal framework  and land titling and registration.  A World-Bank project,
with  the general  objective  to  carry  out a  rural cadastre,  modernize  the  system of national  land registry,
and  to  regularize  the  situation  of beneficiaries  from  agrarian  reform  under  the  Sandinista  as  well  as
subsequent  governments,  has  since  1992  awarded  more  than 40,000  titles  all  over  the  country.  With
titling of the "reform sector"  almost completed, policy-makers  are now interested  to examine not only the
impact of this intervention but also to explore  whether there is justification for expanding these programs,
possibly in a modified form, to the "non-reform sector",  i.e. all the lands under private land ownership.
A number of design aspects  of this program provide  a background  for an  evaluation which,  by assessing
the impact  of the past program, can  help to provide an answer to this policy  question.  First, emphasis  in
this as  well as most other donor-financed  projects was  on the  "Agrarian  Reform Sector",  i.e.  lands that
were distributed under pre- and-post-  1990 agrarian  reforms. Titling of these lands was almost completed
during the period under concern.  To the extent that wealthy land owners had already undertaken  the steps
necessary to formalize their land claims, this process is likely to have been well targeted  towards the poor.
Second,  the  nature  of titles  awarded  changed  significantly  during  the  period  under  concern.  While
initially,  beneficiaries  received  only a title certificate  which  fell  short of full legal  proof of ownership,
realization of the fact that these  were deficient  in many respects led subsequently  to official instructions  to
give  out  only  titles  that had  also  been  properly  registered.  Supply-side  variables  such  as  shortages  in
staffing  and  availability  of  funds,  as  well  as  complex  procedures,  appear  to  have  limited  the
implementation  of this order on the ground.  As  only registered titles  provide evidence  that any possible
claims  by previous  land-owners  had  been  settled,  they  imply  a  much  higher  level  of tenure  security.
Finally, the program  was offered  to beneficiaries  free of direct cost and provided  assistance to meet the
indirect costs  in terms  of time,  transportation,  and  the transaction  costs associated  with obtaining  proper
documentation (e.g. birth certificates  and identification cards) that are still needed for participation.
52.2  Data sources
We use a survey conducted by the World Bank,  the University of Wisconsin, and  a local NGO, between
February  and  April  of 2000.  This  survey  contains,  in  addition  to  standard  household  characteristics,
information on income sources, an elaborate  section  on agricultural production, a land inventory and land
acquisition history,  as well as  a history  of land-related  investments  and questions on the participation  in
and perception  of the  titling program.  The  sample  consists  of four different  groups  of rural producers,
namely (i)  a nationally representative  sample of producers in the private sector; (ii) beneficiaries from the
govemment's  titling program;  (iii) land-poor  rural  households  who rely to a  significant  extent on rural
labor and land rental markets; (iv) and recent entrants in the land purchase or rental market.  The detailed
construction of the sample is explained below.
The  basis  for  this  survey  is  a  nationally  representative  area-sample  of  1360  farmers  who  were  first
surveyed in  1996  by the Nicaraguan  Ministry  of Agriculture  and Forestry  (MAGFOR)  in  collaboration
with FAO.  As  the  number  of titling  beneficiaries  in  this  group  would  have  been  too  small  to  make
inferences  on the impact of titling,  we  complement  the sample with  461  households  who were  sampled
randomly from a list of beneficiaries  who participated in the Government's  land titling program between
1994 and  1997.  To compensate  for the absence  of landless  and poor households  in this  sample (which is
based on  area  rather than  households),  we  added  372  rural  households  with very little  or no land  who
were  sampled  randomly  from a rural household  panel first  surveyed  by FIDEG,  a local NGO,  in  1996.
Finally, 282 of the panel households who had been included in the  1996 MAGFORIFAO  survey were no
longer present at the plot they had cultivated  in  1996.  These were replaced with the household who  was
farming  the  land  under  question  at  the  time  of  the  survey  in  order  to  obtain  information  on  the
characteristics  of land buyers and/or renters who recently entered the land market. Taken together, these 4
groups provide a comprehensive picture of the rural sector in Nicaragua.
2.3  Descriptive  statistics
Using  the  data  to  generate  descriptive  statistics  by group  points  towards  large  differences  in  income
sources  and  levels  as  well  as  access  to basic  infrastructure.  Total  farmn  area varies  considerably  and  is
strongly  positively  correlated  with  levels  of household  welfare,  even  though  land productivity  varies
inversely  with holding  size,  being  highest for the smallest  producers.  The impact,  as  well as  the recent
acceleration,  of the  governments'  land  titling  programs  is  clearly  visible  from  the  data  and  socio-
economic  characteristics.  The data also point to the fact that land regularization  programs have benefited
the poor. More importantly, producers express a clear desire for clarification of land tenure status through
registration,  implying that the programs may be associated with tangible economic benefits.
6Socio-economic  characteristics of sample households
Table  1 reports  descriptive  statistics  for socio-economic  characteristics  at  the national  level (column  1)
and disaggregated  by the  different  groups discussed  earlier  (columns 2 to 5). The  data highlight that the
rural  households  in the sample  are large  (with 9  members  on  average)  and have relatively  low levels  of
access  to  infrastructure  such  as electricity  (43%) housing  (63%  have a  dirt floor and  52% clay  of wood
walls). Most  of them obtain their  main livelihood from agricultural  activities.  Distances  to infrastructure
are  considerable,  with the  average producer  being located  82 km from the next paved  road  and  58 km
from the next NGO.
Annual per capita  income,  which  is constructed  by  adding  agricultural  profits,  agricultural  wages,  non-
agricultural  wages and profits,  and non-earned income,  in the sample is slightly below US $ 400, close to
the  one  dollar a  day  poverty  line.  Disaggregation  of household  income  reveals  that about  60%  comes
from an own farm enterprise  - either crop (25%) or in livestock farming  (35%). As one would expect in a
relatively  land  abundant  environment,  there  is  little  agricultural  wage  employment;  total  wage
employment  accounts for less than 5%  of household  income.  It is noteworthy,  however,  that profits from
non-agricultural  enterprises contribute  far more (25%)  to households'  income than does non-agricultural
wage income  (9%).  One  explanation  for  this  could  be  that,  presumably  due  to  the  existence  of entry
barriers  to own enterprise formation, households  who need to rely on wage employment  will obtain only
low levels of return  to their human  capital,  as  was found in  Colombia (Deininger  and Olinto 2001). Not
surprisingly,  land  and livestock  are the  two main  forms  of wealth,  each  making up almost 40%  of total
household assets. Agricultural  machinery  (16%), land-attached  investments (5%),  and non-farm business
assets (2.5%)  occupy less important places in the ranking of households'  asset endowments.
Comparing the different groups  introduced earlier,  we find that land buyers and established producers  are,
with per capita incomes  of C$6,690 and  C$ 4,740, clearly better off than landless  and beneficiaries  from
the titling program  whose per  capita income is consistently  below C$ 2,000 (with  an exchange rate of 12
C$ to one US$ at the time of the survey).  In addition to the magnitude,  there area also marked  changes  in
the composition  of income over time.  Households who have access to land obtain on average 60% of their
income from agricultural  self-employment.  By contrast, the landless obtain less than  15%  of their income
from agriculture,  rely  on wages for almost  60% of their income,  and  receive the remainder through  self
employment.  Interestingly,  agricultural  wages,  most  of them  derived  from  precarious  day  labor  on  a
seasonal basis, contribute,  with 33%, more to the income of this group than either non-agricultural  self or
wage employment  (26%  and 23%, respectively),  indicating that they have to depend on the marginal and
volatile wage labor market in rural areas. Titling beneficiaries  differ from the rest in having a low level of
agricultural  income  as  well  as  a relatively  stronger  emphasis  on  crops  as  compared  to  livestock.  Land
7buyers earn  high levels of non-agricultural  profits and high levels of livestock profits,  suggesting that at
least  some of them are relatively  affluent non-agricultural  businessmen  and cattle ranchers  who buy land
and expand into livestock largely for non-economic  reasons.
Endowments  of both  assets  and human capital  also differ between  the groups.  Titling beneficiaries  and
landless  households  own, with C$  85,000 and  15,000  significantly  lower levels  of assets  than the other
two groups  (C$  209,000  and 268,000).  Also,  even though  general  human capital  endowments  are  very
low in general, their human capital endowment  is significantly lower with the household  head having 1.77
and  2.25  years  of education,  as compared  to 2.60  and  3.36  for established  producers  and  land  buyers,
respectively,.  Although  titling  beneficiaries  own  considerable  amounts  of land,  its  location  far  from
infrastructure,  with almost 150  km to the next road and  100 km to the next NGO, confirms the notion that
land reform,  and  subsequent titling efforts,  were focussed  mainly on econornically  less valuable frontier
land.  By  comparison,  land poor  households  are  closer  to  infrastructure  but  lack assets.  We  note that
participation in social organizations such as NGOs and churches has increased  since 1990; this could be a
sign that this type of organizations has started substituting for formal government structures.
Agricultural productivity
As profits  from agriculture  and  livestock-related  activities  make  up almost  two  thirds  of the  average
sample households'  income,  more attention to the  specific aspect  is warranted.  The top panel of table 2
illustrates that mean operated  and owned  area amounted to 48 and 46.6 manzanas (mzs;  1 mz. = 0.7 ha),
respectively.  Slightly less  than  one  third  of  the owned  area  (13.5  mzs)  was  cultivated  with  annual  or
perennial  crops  including  fruit  trees  and  home  gardens,  about  two  thirds  (27  mzs)  were  devoted  to
pasture, and  the remainder  (6  mzs) was  under fallow or forest. About 20%  of households relied  on land
rental markets  to rent in land and 8%  rented  out land.  The median  profit per mz was  C$ 310. With land
prices of about C$ 3,000 per mz, this would imply a rate of capitalization of slightly less than 10%.
Differentiating  among  the  sub-groups  of the  sample  introduced  earlier  reveals  considerable  variation
across those.  During the reference period for the survey,  mean operated  area  was 92 mzs for land buyers
but only 3 mzs for land scarce households.  Nonetheless, mean cultivated area  was between  13 and  16 mzs
for all groups  except the land scarce  households. Adjustments  are made largely in terms  of pasture  land.
Established producers and land buyers use the large majority of their lands for livestock and only between
15%  and  30% for crop production.  The opposite is true  for participants  in the titling program and land-
poor  households  who  devote  between  two  thirds  and  71%  of  owned  land  area  to  crops  rather  than
livestock.
8Figures  on median profits per manzana,  which  are less sensitive to outliers than means, indicate  that land
scarce  households  are,  with  a  profit  of  C$  523  per  mz.  the  most  productive,  followed  by established
producers  (C$  357),  land  buyers  (C$  282),  and  beneficiaries  from the  titling  program  (C$  191).  The
dispersion  of  this  variable  is  highest  within  the  group  of land  scarce  producers,  followed  by  titling
beneficiaries,  established  producers and land buyers.  This suggests that, at the margin,  increasing the land
endowment  of land scarce households, could have a large impact  on overall productivity.  Indeed,  we note
that the distribution  of operated  land  is not only  slightly  more equal than the distribution  of owned  land
but also that rental  markets  allow  almost half of the 447  households  in the sample who do not own any
land to get access  to land for agricultural  production.  This points towards an equalizing  impact of the land
rental market.  The hypothesis  that the rental market transfers land to more productive  producers receives
support  from  the  observation  that  land-scarce  household  rely  disproportionately  on  rental  markets  -
almost  40%  rent in land,  allowing to  increase  the  average  ownership  endowment  by almost  50%.  This
could suggest that land rental market have an important role to play to allow poor producers get access  to
productive resources,  an issue that is left for future research.
The second panel of table  2 provides information  on households'  tenure  status. We note that, in general,
and  not surprisingly  in  view  of the  earlier  discussion  of Nicaragua's  land  titling program,  the level  of
registration  is quite  high.  63%  of producers  have at  least one formally  registered  plot,  34%  an agrarian
reform title and only  I 1% and  3.4%, respectively,  an informal document  or no document.  This  is in line
with  other  sources  which  indicate  that  between  10%  and  25%  of  the  land  area  -generally  the  most
controversial  and difficult  ones-  suffer from remaining  tenure  insecurity  (Merlet  and  Pomnuier  2000).
Differentiating among  groups points towards marked  differences, especially regarding  the titling program.
About  80% of established  producers,  70%  of land scarce  households,  and  65%  of land buyers but only
16% of titling program participants  have  a formally  registered document.  In turn, almost  90%  of titling
participants  have an agrarian  reform title but no fully registered  document, compared to less than 20%  for
all of the other groups  with the exception  of land buyers. The high share of agrarian reform titles held by
land  buyers  could  indicate  that  many  of  these  bought  land  from  participants  in  the  titling  program.
Examining this in more detail transcends the scope of this paper but would be very worthwhile to find out
more about the impact of titling on land sales market transactions.
A  highly  gender-sensitive  legislation  has  generally  been  identified  as  one  of the  great  advantages  of
Nicaragua  as compared  to other countries  (Deere  and Leon,  2000). While this would lead us to expect  a
high level of joint titles, the data suggest that, at least in the perception of survey respondents,  joint titling
has been of limited relevance.  In the sample as a whole, only between  5% and 6% of households  reported
to have  a document issued jointly for husband and wife (mancomunado) or a plot to which title was held
9jointly. Even  for the  sub-sample  of participants  who participated  in recent titling efforts,  this number  is
less than 20%  - very small compared to claims that about  80% of titles were issued jointly.  One possible
explanation for this is that respondents  may not have been aware of the exact nature of the documents.  A
second possibility  that is supported to  some extent by anecdotal  evidence is that even though titles were
given to husband and wife jointly but that the wife had actually signed away their part of the title. Part of
this low percentage may be due to the constraints  imposed by the survey which did not allow for physical
inspection  of  households'  documents  by  the  enumerator  and  identification  of  which  of  the  two
possibilities  pertain  would  be of great interest.  Nonetheless,  as it is unlikely that a joint title  will  affect
household  behavior  unless  there  is  awareness  of  its  nature,  this  finding  suggests  that,  unless  they  are
combined with greater efforts  at dissemination  and awareness  building,  issuance of joint titles may have a
rather limited impact  on actual  decisions  and thus have limited  impact on  improving women's position.
More detailed research  on this issue would be of great interest.
Changes in land tenure status and the demand for titling and registration
At the time  the survey  was  undertaken,  the 2475  sample households  owned  3659  plots. Information  on
changes  in  the  legal and  tenure  status  of individual  plots,  which  was  obtained  from producers'  recall,
allows to construct the transition matrices presented  in table 3. These matrices,  for the 1990-1996 and the
1996-1999  periods,  illustrate  that,  during  the  last decade,  the  status  of ownership  has  changed  for  a
significant  number  of  plots.  To  interpret  them,  note  that  the  percentages  do  not  add  up  to  100  as
households  may have  plots under different  tenure  categories  and that only  plots that were  owned in  the
initial  period  are included.  With regards  to the  titling program,  one  notes  that a large  number  of plots
received title during the last decade  and that the progress  of titling programs  accelerated markedly during
the 1996-99 period.
At the same  time, table 3  illustrates  that, somewhat surprisingly, government  efforts largely concentrated
on  the  award  of agrarian  reform  titles  rather than  full  registration.  To  demonstrate  this,  note  that  the
number of plots  with agrarian  reform title more than doubled  in both periods,  from 206 to 419 between
1990 and  1996,  and from 336 to 690 between  1996 and  1999.  By comparison,  only  121  and  166 plots,
respectively,  were  registered  during the first  and the  second period.  This  suggests  that registration was
either associated high transaction costs,  e.g. in the form of complicated pre-requisites  and procedures,  and
distances  to registry  offices  or that the public  sector  was initially  unable to fulfill its mandate  of giving
fully registered titles.
To ascertain  whether these programs were perceived  to be associated with any benefits, households  who
had  received  title  were  asked  whether they  felt to have  benefited  from this  event  and, if yes, what the
character  of these benefits  was.  The  data (not reported separately)  indicate  that the majority of program
10participants  (77%)  perceived  the  program  to  have  had  a  beneficial  impact.  Elimination  of  tenure
insecurity was  clearly  the most important  benefit  (88%),  with credit access  a distant  third  (2.5%).  This
provides a first indication that titling may have been associated  with economic  benefits through increased
tenure security and investment demand rather than credit supply.
What  are  the  mechanisms  through  which  the  benefits  from  titling  come  about?  According  to  survey
results,  households'  demand for registration  is clearly  higher than that for title only  (table 4). Of the 874
households  who  owned  at  least  one plot without  title,  more  than  90%  indicated  that the reason  for  not
obtaining  a formal  title  was that it was  "not worth the effort"  and  only 7% that they would  like to have
title  but  lacked  the  resources,  mostly in terms  of time,  needed  to obtain  it. The  situation  is  completely
opposite for registration  - of the 559 households  who fulfilled the pre-conditions  for registration  of their
plots (i.e.  who had a title), 84% indicated that having their plot registered would be desirable but that they
lacked the resources  for doing so. In addition to signaling strong demand for tenure  security, this suggests
that, in the context of Nicaragua,  policy  initiatives which fail to award  full registration  may fall short  of
both  beneficiaries'  expectations  and  economic  necessities.  Thus,  while  titling  seems  to  have  clearly
responded  to a demand for greater  tenure security from producers,  the strategy of giving title without full
registration appears to have fallen short by what was desired by most producers.
The notion of incomplete government efforts  is supported by the fact that, while virtually  all beneficiaries
were satisfied with  the technical  and legal  aspects of the processes  adopted,  30%  indicate  that there were
shortcomings  in  the registration  of the  property  to which  they had received  agrarian  reform  title.  This
suggests that, in the context of rural Nicaragua,  land rights regularization has significant welfare  effects. It
also highlights that, in an environment where most large producers had already obtained  title on their own
initiative,  awarding  certificates  to small  producers  could benefit the less well  off.  In the next section  we
will analyze  in detail  the  economic  impact  titling and registration.  We  will do so  by exploring  whether
greater  security  of  individual  land  ownership  will  be associated  with higher  levels  of investment,  the
extent to which  such investment  is economically  and socially beneficial, and  whether greater land tenure
security will affect land values.
3.  Analytical framework
In  this section  we  introduce  the framework  for analysis of investment effects,  the extent to which  tenure
insecurity  may result in a  socially sub-optimal  asset portfolio,  and the impact of tenure  security  on land
values.  The data at hand are well suited to this task. In terms of investment we can use actual evidence  on
largely labor-intensive  land related investment before  and after the intervention for beneficiaries  and non-
11beneficiaries,  thus providing  an estimnate of the impact of titling on this type of investment rather than just
correlations  with  little  indication  of  causality.  Availability  of  production  data  allows  us  to  make
inferences on the extent to  which any tendency  towards  increased  investment,  which may have  resulted
from the land titling effort,  helped  to counteract  previous under-investment.  With regard  to land values,
we are able to control for household fixed effects,  in addition to tenure characteristics,  for observable plot
characteristics  such as topography,  slope,  and distance to the homestead,  thereby  eliminating unobserved
factors  that may,  in  a  simple  cross-sectional  equation,  easily  result  in biased  coefficients  which  would
overestimate the impact of titling.
3.1  Titling and land-related investment
The  notion  that  the  greater  tenure  security  accorded  by  possession  of  registered  land  title  will  be
associated with higher levels of investment  is a key element  in the literature  (e.g. Feder et al.  1988). The
relationship  between  possession  of title  and  higher  levels  of land-attached  investments  has  repeatedly
been confirmed  in  cross-sectional  equations (see Binswanger, Deininger,  and Feder  1995).  Even though
numerous  studies  have demonstrated  that  land tenure has an investment-enhancing  effect  (Besley  1985,
Rozelle  et al.  1998; Gavian and  Fafchamps  1996), the inability  to control for unobservable  households-
specific characteristics  may, however,  have resulted  in biased coefficients.  For example, it is likely that
producers  with better access to credit or infrastructure  were  more likely to acquire title. This would lead
to an overestimate  and thus limit the ability to use the results of such analysis  to extrapolate on the impact
of changes in title status brought about by titling programs.  Availability of data on investment before and
after title  was  received  at the plot  level  allows  us  to deal  with  this  concern  by using  the  difference  in
investment  levels rather than the simple amount of investment.
In other words, we use the monetary value of all the land-attached investments that were available in 1990
and  1999.  These  include  irrigation  facilities;  processing  and  storage  structures  such  as  sheds,  silos,
warehouses  and  coffee  processing  plants;  and  livestock  structures  such  as  stables,  silos,  and  fencing.
Subtracting  the value of such investments  in  1990 from what was  available  in  1999  allows to construct
the net investment  on plot i Ali.  Regressing  this variable  on initial title  status,  the change in title status
during the period, and a vector of time invariant characteristics,  helps to obtain an estimate of the impact
of an exogenous change in tenure status on investment. Formally, we estimate an equation of the form
Ali = a +6  fXj,  + A  Z, + £i
where Xi, is  a vector of time varying  characteristics  (e.g.  whether the plot has a title or is registered), and
Z  is  a  vector  of time  invariant  characteristics  such  as  soil  quality  and  other  physio-geographic  plot
features.  Note in particular  that  this  specification  allows  us  to  test empirically  between  two competing
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plots  the  tenure  of which  is  highly  insecure  as  a  way  of establishing  claims  to  ownership,  we  would
expect  a significant coefficient  on  agrarian reform title (or on initial  levels of investment).  Alternatively,
if award  of title causes  investment,  we  would expect significance  of the receipt of title. Empirically,  we
use both a  zero-one dummy for whether any investment  was undertaken  in a probit as  well as the actual
amount of land-related  investment in a tobit specification.
In addition to testing the impact of title, an economically interesting issue is whether, before the receipt of
title, the level and composition  of investment had,  in some sense, been sub-optimal.  In this case one could
argue that the increased  tenure  security may have allowed  producers to move closer to the optimum level
of investment  and/or  a  more  balanced  asset  portfolio.  To  examine  this  issue,  we  use  the  fact  that
investment decisions  by rational profit-maximizing  producers  would equalize marginal returns,  properly
adjusted  for  the  risk of  loss  of the  asset,  across  moveable  and  land-attached  assets.  One reason  for
observed returns  to these two classes  of assets  to be  systematically  different  from each other would then
be that producers attach a higher risk of asset loss to one category  than to the other.  If there are systematic
differences  in the security  of property  rights to  mobile  and immobile  assets,  returns  to immobile  assets
should be consistently  higher than those for mobile ones (e.g. livestock and machinery) to compensate for
the higher risk of asset loss involved.
To  explore  this  empirically,  we  regress  household  i's  profits  from  total  agricultural  plus  livestock
production  7ri  on  a vector Li of endowments  and exogenous  characteristics  (including regional  dummnies)
and a standard error term, in a "pseudo-profit function" of the form
7,= a +  5 Li + ei
Note that Li includes  land-attached  investments  and moveable  assets,  in addition to households'  level of
education and that we omit prices which are captured by regional dummies.  In this case, the coefficients a5
provide the return on various  fixed factors  such as education  and different types of assets included on the
right hand  side. If returns  across different types of assets  were equalized, it would be impossible to reject
the hypothesis  that, for any  two of the elements k and I included  in the vector Li, &k  = 31.  The ability to
reject this hypothesis,  on the other hand, would imply that shifting investment  from one class of assets  to
the other would result  in an increase  of total profits. Thus, if titling increases the scope for land-attached
investments,  measures to increase producers'  tenure  security  could result in increased  agricultural profits
and higher overall productivity  in the economy.
133.2  Titling and land values
Even  if one  finds  a  positive  impact  of  land  tenure  security  on  investment,  this  will,  without  strong
assumptions  on the benefits  from such investments, not provide us with an estimate of the net impact of
such an intervention  on land  values  and thus households'  net asset position. This  figure  is of interest to
obtain an idea of the impact of such a program on household  welfare and thus the maximum cost for such
a program from a social point of view as well as possible cost recovery measures.  To get such an estimate
will require  an  examination  of the extent  to which,  over and above  any potential impact  on investment
and the value of land attached assets, possession of title will also increase land values.
To  provide  the  background  for  analysis,  note  that  the  value  V of  any  asset  such  as  land  equals  the
discounted net present value of cash flows generated by this asset.
V = S'r,
.=o
where  r, is  the return received in period t and a  1  is the discount factor with i being the opportunity cost
1Ii
of capital. The notion that all factors that can possibly affect the expected stream of returns to land will be
capitalized  in  land  values  has  long  provided  the  underpinning  for  estimation  of  hedonic  land  price
regressions  of the form  V, = f(Z)  where Z is a vector  of exogenously  given quality characteristics  (e.g.
Rosen  1974). Availability  of self-reported  land values for each of the plots under consideration makes  it
easy  to implement  this  methodology.  However,  while  this methodology  is  appropriate  in  cases  where
quality characteristics  are exogenous,  problems  may arise if land values are also affected by unobservable
household  characteristics.  Consider the discount  rate i which may  be household  specific, depending  on
whether or not the household has access  to capital at the market interest rate. If, as is commonly assumed,
poor households  have higher discount rates and are less likely to be titled, the coefficients from a simple
hedonic regression  may be biased.  Formally, let i denote households  and p plots within the household.  In
this case, estimation of
vip =  ai + fl Zip  +  Sti + Eip
will produce biased estimates of the coefficient  vector/I because of correlation  between the unobservable
household-specific  error term  4t,  and  Z.  Indeed,  this  appears  to have been  a problem  in many  cross-
sectional  studies  of this  issue.  To  eliminate  ai  and  thus  obtain  an  equation  that  will  yield  unbiased
estimates  via ordinary  least squares,  we make use of the availability of information  on multiple plots per
household to estimate a fixed effect household-level  regression.  Let V  be the mean  value of all plots for
any given household  and  Z the mean of the associated  characteristics.  Then, as shown, among others by
14Hausman  and Taylor (1981),  taking the mean  over all plots owned by the household  and subtracting  this
from the original equation produces
Vp -Vi  =A(Zip -Zi)  + sip - 6i
which  is an  equation  that  will produce  unbiased estimates  of the,8's, which  are the main  parameters  of
interest  in the  above equation.  Elements  included  in the  vector Z are exogenously  given  physical  land
characteristics  such as the topography,  land attached  investments,  the type of land use, area and length of
possession, and the titling status which, as discussed above, can also be considered  to be exogenous.
4.  Empirical results
Applying  this analytical  framework to the Nicaraguan data at hand,  we obtain three main results. First, the
propensity  to  undertake  largely  labor-intensive  investments  is  increased  significantly  by  the receipt  of
land title and the nature of the data allows to virtually exclude the possibility of reverse causality.  Second,
comparison  of returns  across  asset  classes  points  towards  significantly  higher returns  (28%)  for  assets
attached  to land as  compared  to moveable  assets  (3%)  and livestock  (11%).  This suggests  that award of
title would not  only  increase  investment but also  help producers to move towards  an asset portfolio that
would  be  socially  more optimal.  Finally,  we  find that values  for land that is registered  (but not merely
titled)  are  almost 30%  higher than for  land that  is not. This implies  not only  that programs  to improve
tenure  security  can  have  a  significant  impact  but  also  that  the  legal  nature  of the  documents  being
awarded  clearly  matters.  Simple  award  of a  document  is  thus  not equivalent  to greater  tenure  security
(Wachter,  1992)  and  producers  are  well  aware  of the  much  lower  tenure  security  conveyed  by  non-
registered titles and adapt their behavior accordingly.
4.1  Investment impact of increased tenure security
Results from the probit  as  well as tobit regression  equations  for net investment  are presented  in table 5.
Since the main form of intervention  was to either award  agrarian reform title or full registration,  we use a
probit  equation with  a  zero-one dummy for whether an investment had  taken place, and  a tobit with the
actual  amount  of  investment.  The  Huber-White  heteroskedasticity-consistent  estimator  is  used
throughout. The probit equation illustrates that full registration of a plot after 1990 had a very  significant
investment-enhancing  impact;  according to the regression  results it increased  the propensity to invest by
between  8%  and  9%  (figures  in column  1 of table  5 are marginal  probabilities).  It also highlights  that
award  of agrarian  reform  title per  se,  without accompanying  registration,  had only  minimal  impact on
investment.  The coefficient  on this  variable  is  small  (increasing  the marginal  propensity  of undertaking
15investment  by  between  1.2%  and  2.8%  in  the  regressions  without  and  with  regional  dummies,
respectively)  and  insignificant  at  any  conventional  level  of  significance.  Finally,  the  propensity  to
undertake land-related  investment on plots that had been registered before  1990 was  still higher by about
4% than on the rest, pointing towards  a continuing beneficial impact of registration on investment.
These broad conclusions  are confirmed by the tobit regressions where,  instead of a zero/one  indicator, the
value of the investment is used as the dependent variable. The propensity to make investments emerges as
significantly higher on plots that were registered after 1990 whereas receipt of agrarian reform title during
the  same  period  did  not  have  any  perceptible  impact.  Registration  before  1990  is,  as  in  the  probit
equation, of lesser impact and of marginal significance.
The  signs and magnitudes of most other variables are as expected (table 5). We find that the propensity  to
invest  is  higher  on  larger  plots  but  that  this  impact  decreases  in  size  (as  indicated  by  the  negative
coefficient  on  the squared  area). This  is consistent  with  the  presence  of fixed setup  cost for investment
which  would  generate  increasing  returns  to  scale  to  investment  on  large  fields.  Other  things  equal,
investment is more likely to occur on house plots, on undulating plots, and on those that already had some
perennials  initially.  While plots under  forest  or fallow are  less  likely  to receive  investment,  there  is no
difference  between  plots  planted  to  annuals  (the  excluded  category  in the  regression)  and  those  under
pasture.  Also,  and contrary  to  what is  generally  found  for  other  countries,  length of possession  is  not
estimated to have a significant investment-enhancing  impact. This can be explained by the fact that, in the
context  of Nicaragua,  the  main  risk to  land  ownership  is  the  emergence  of a  legal  challenge  to land
ownership  by somebody  who claims to  have owned the land before  1979.  Whether  somebody  received
the land  in  the  1990s  or  the  1980s  did, in this  context,  not seem  to make  a big  difference  in  terms  of
tenure  security.  Similarly,  our results  do not  support the hypothesis  of a reverse  causality  according  to
which investment would be undertaken  to increase tenure  security rather than being the consequence  of a
higher level of tenure  security.  To further test for this possibility,  we  included the level  of pre-existing
investment  which  consistently  remained  insignificant  (not  reported).  Greater  land  tenure  security
therefore appears to lead to higher levels of investment rather than the other way round.
To examine the economic  impact of such investment,  we turn to estimation  of a pseudo-profit  function as
discussed above.  As the dependent variable  is in logs, the coefficients  on different  types of assets can be
interpreted as these assets'  marginal contribution  to profits.  A summary of results  is displayed  in table 6.
One  notes that, with  a point estimate of about 29%, returns to land-attached  investments  are the highest,
followed  by  returns  on  livestock  (12%)  and  those  on machinery  (3%).  The  hypotheses  of equality  of
returns  between  land-attached  investments  and  livestock,  as  well  as  land-attached  investment  and
machinery,  can be rejected at the  10%  and 1%  levels of confidence,  respectively by using standard t tests.
16Note  also that education  has  a large  and highly significant  impact - increasing  educational  levels by one
year would, other things equal,  increase profits by almost C$ 2,500.  In line with our hypothesis, 'marginal
returns  to land-attached  investment  are  higher than  those  to  mobile  capital,  shifting  resources  from  the
latter towards  the  former  will  increase  overall  economic  efficiency.  This  suggests  that,  in  addition  to
enhancing  overall levels of investment,  the higher level of tenure security brought about by land titling in
Nicaragua  will  also  lead  to  a  more  optimal  balance  in  the  mix  of investment  between  moveable  and
attached  goods.
Taken  together,  these two  results provide  a  strong justification  for programs  of titling  and  registration
from  an  economic  perspective,  supporting  what  had  already  emerged  from  the descriptive  analysis.  In
addition,  they  are  consistent  with  producers'  desire  for full  registration  of land  ownership,  rather  than
merely  award  of  an  agrarian  reform  title,  as  evidenced  earlier  in  the  descriptive  analysis.  In  the
Nicaraguan  context.  which  can  be  taken  to be  representative  of  situations  with high  levels  of endemic
tenure insecurity,  producers need a legally clear title rather than  an intermediate substitute.  Only having a
legally valid title seems to prompt them to increase their level of investment.  This suggests that, by falling
short  of full  registration,  the  government's  program  may have  foregone  considerable  gains  in  terms  of
investment  and  the  higher  levels  of production  and  welfare  this  would  have  implied.  To  exarrmine  the
extent  to which  such lack of investment  was sub-optimal  from  an economic  perspective,  we tum to the
results from the land price regression  as discussed earlier.
4.2  Tenure security and land values
Results  for  the  estimation  of the  land price  regression  using  OLS,  as  well  as  random effects  and  fixed
effects  techniques,  are reported  in table 7.  Note first that the results empirically confirm that presence  of
correlation  between  unobservables  and the  right hand  side variables  in  the  regression.  Moving  from the
OLS  to  the  fixed  effects  regression,  the  coefficient  on  the  value  of  land  improvements  decreases
continuously,  from 6.1%  in the  OLS regression  to 2.3%  in the equation  with household  fixed effects.  This
suggests that more productive  households  are more  likely to undertake  land improvements.  As it can not
distinguish  between  the  two  effects,  estimation  via  OLS  would  result  in  serious  overestimation  of the
impact of such investment.  The same is true for land registration,  the coefficient  of which decreases from
37%  to 29%  as  one moves  from OLS  to fixed  effects.  Indeed,  performing a Hausman  test confirms  the
presence of correlation  between Z and the household  specific elements of the error term; the X2statistic  of
129.9  leads to  a clear rejection  of the  hypothesis  of no  correlation between  Z and  s, thus indicating  that
the fixed effect estimates are more  appropriate.  In interpreting  the results, we will therefore  focus on these
coefficients.
17Concerning  the  impact of titling and  registration,  we  find that both formal  and informal  rights  enhance
land values. The regression  suggests that rights of possession,  as embodied in length of time during which
the plot had been cultivated,  provide a marginal increase  in tenure security whereby  each additional year
the plot has been held  by the current owner increases land values  by  1.3%. Compared to this, registration
of a  plot  signifies  a  quantum  jump  in  tenure  security.  Using  the  point  estimate  for  the  impact  of
possession, one notes that registration would increase land values by about 30%, equivalent  to more than
20 years  of continuous  possession.  In addition,  having  purchased  a plot  is estimated  to  increase  land
values  by  28%,  most  likely  because  presence  of a  sales  receipt  allows  land  owners  to  better  defend
themselves  against challenges to the legitimacy of claims to their land.  In this context, it is of interest  to
note  that the  value  of plots that  were  acquired  through  agrarian  reform varies  systematically  with  the
regime  under which such acquisition  took place. The (insignificant) coefficient  on the dummy for receipt
of agrarian  reform lands before  1990 under the Sandinista regime  suggests that,  other things equal, those
lands are worth  less than those  received  under  agrarian reform efforts afterwards.  By comparison,  lands
obtained under agrarian  reform after  1990 are more valuable  than those informally occupied  (the omitted
category). Award of an agrarian reform title to a plot that had been received before 1990 can, according to
the regression estimate, more than double its value. Over and above the impact of title, neither topography
nor land  use (which  is, of course,  endogenous  at least  to some degree),  are estimated to have  a strong
impact on land values.
These  results suggest not only that the titling effort had  a perceptible  economic  impact but also that,  by
initially focusing on "agrarian reform" lands,  the government has identified areas  where increasing  tenure
security  had  a  high payoff.  However,  by awarding in the  great majority  only agrarian  reform titles that
stopped  far short from  full registration,  considerable  and relatively  immediate  benefits  were  foregone.
Our  analysis  suggests  that  avoiding  this  shortcoming  and  providing  fully  registered  title  can  greatly
enhance  the  economic  benefits  to  be  expected  from  the  current  land  titling  efforts.  Indeed,  the
Government  has recently  made  plans to systematically  register  all plots  that have  undergone the titling
process.  Given  that  most  of the  land  owners  who  remain  under  insecure  tenure  are  precarious  small
producers,  doing so could, by increasing  the  value of the land endowment of the poor, also  have  a large
and beneficial  impact on equity.  From a policy  perspective,  this would  imply that even  a program  that
combined land titling with a way of recovering some of the cost of such an investment, e.g.  in the form of
land taxes, would be unlikely to have adverse effects on equity. To the contrary, by increasing the revenue
base  of local governments  and accountability  for the use of tax revenues at this  level,  such a  step could
possibly make an important contribution to the process of decentralization and local governance.
185.  Conclusion
Evidence  from  a  program  for  land  titling  and  registration  from  Nicaragua's  agrarian  reform  sector
indicates that this program managed to target the poor and,  to the extent that it was properly implemented,
also  (i) resulted  in  a  significant  increase  in tenure  security  and  land-attached  investments;  (ii)  shifted
investment  towards  land-related  items  with high  economic  retums  which  were previously  discriminated
against;  and (iii)  caused  an  appreciable  increase  in land prices.  The  fact that the  program  was targeted
towards  the agrarian  reform  sector and that changes  in  the  design, in particular  the  shift from awarding
only  agrarian  reform  titles  to  full  registration,  were  made  exogenously,  allows  to  allay  fears  of
endogeneity  and reverse  causality that typically  plague evaluations  of land titling programs.  Availability
of information  on  a  large  and  nationally  representative  control  group  of non-beneficiaries  outside  the
reform  sector,  together  with  the  ability  to  compare  land  values  of  multiple  plots  within  the  same
households, allow us not only to control for unobservable  variables that might result in biased coefficients
but also to empirically demonstrate that such bias does indeed exist.  This indicates that, in an environment
where  tenure insecurity  is high  and endemic,  a systematic program of land titling can provide  significant
economic  benefits  to  the poor.  We conclude  by highlighting  a number of implications  for policy  as well
as research.
A first conclusion  is that the legal validity  of the titles distributed under a titling program clearly matters.
The ability to discern a clear investment and land price effect suggests that there may be a wider range of
situations  with  endemic  insecurity  where interventions  to enhance  tenure security,  if building  on a  clear
legal  basis, can  be justified.  At the  same  time,  the fact  that even in Nicaragua,  the majority  of the  titles
received  was not properly  registered  suggests that,  in many cases,  the failure to find  a significant  impact
of titling in the literature  may  be due to the fact that the  legal value  of the documents  awarded may have
been deficient  or  doubtful.  This highlights  the  need that  sufficient  attention  be devoted to ensuring  the
legal validity of certificates  to be distributed, especially  in view of the fact that implementing  agencies, as
well  as international  donors,  often may  have  a strong  preference  to maximize the number of certificates
issued,  rather  than  their  quality,  to  demonstrate  high  levels  of  accomplishment.  Whether,  in  specific
settings,  the  failure  to detect  an  impact  of titling  programs  may be  due  to  the fact  that the  certificates
issued were of limited legal validity, is an interesting proposition that might be explored further.
Second,  the  effect  of  land  title  on  land  values,  together  with  the  descriptive  evidence  suggesting  that
titling has  benefited those who were less  well off, suggests that, by giving the poor more secure  property
rights to assets which they already own, titling could help improve the distribution of assets and economic
opportunities.  Observing  such  an  effect  in  a  relatively  land  abundant  environment  where  credit  is  of
limited  importance  and most of the  investments  considered  are highly  labor-intensive  suggests that  the
19investment  effect of more secure  land title may be important  in its own right. Identifying cost-effective
ways  to enhance producers'  tenure  security  may thus be important even where credit  markets are absent
or not functioning  well.
Finally,  while  we found clear benefits from titling,  there may be scope for studying in more detail other
channels,  such as activity in land  markets and the associated  credit supply that might be of relevance  to
increase the impact of such interventions.  Descriptive evidence  from the survey suggests that, thus far, the
award  of title  failed  to reverse  a  decline  in  land  market  activity  that  started  with  the  weakening  of
property rights in the aftermath of the Sandinista revolution.  Also, descriptive  evidence does not suggest
that titling has, in a period when several lending institutions  were closed down,  increased  beneficiaries'
access to formal credit.  Exploring the reasons underlying these phenomena,  as well as ways  to overcome
them in the context of a broader land and rural development  policy  that contains  titling as one element
would be a worthwhile topic for future research.
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22Table 1: Socio-economic  characteristics of sample households  in 2000, total and by sub-sample
Total  Established  Land scarce  Titling prog.  Land buyers
Sample  Producers  households  Participants
Household  Characteristics
No. of household members  9.03  9.18  8.94  9.05  8.44
Mean age  27.80  29.79  24.82  25.40  26.06
Female headedhousehold  12%  12%  15%  12%  11%
Head's education (years)  2.48  2.60  2.25  1.77  3.36
Parents  in agriculture  86%  90%  60%  90%  91%
Access  to piped water  73%  70%  94%  65%  72%
Access  to electricity  43%  42%  53%  33%  48%
Dirt floor  63%  57%  68%  79%  57%
Clay or wood walls  52%  50%  52%  63%  45%
Had TV  in 1996  23%  24%  24%  18%  27%
Had radio in  1996  79%  82%  70%  76%  86%
Infrastructure
Distance  to paved road (km)  82  75  31  149  75
Distance to NGO  (km)  58  51  36  100  52
Participation  in churches  11%  14%  11%  4%  6%
Participation  in NGO  4%  4%  2%  7%  5%
Income level  and structure
Total annual income (C$)  34,523  37,466  23,349  16,296  53,997
Agricultural  profits  (C$)  23,846  27,543  7,773  10.665  32,485
from crop production  8,525  9,141  5,731  5,983  10,579
from livestock production  15,322  18,402  2,042  4,682  21,906
Non agricultural  profits  (C$)  6,228  5,167  7,590  2,618  17,206
Agricultural  wages (C$)  1.043  876  3,225  1,231  916
Non-agricultural  wages (C$)  2,915  3,419  4,525  1,571  2,206
Non-earned  income (C$)  490  460  236  211  1,184
Asset portfolio (C$)
Total assets owned  163,812  209,421  14.680  85,573  268,923
Land  62,122  80,743  4,633  48,524  70,607
Livestock  62,381  78,195  5,195  26,578  120,298
Machinery  26,307  33,596  2,246  5,436  57,013
Land-related investments  8,782  11,060  877  3,993  16,049
Non-agric.  enterprise  assets  4,220  5,826  1,729  1,041  4,958
No. of observations  2475  1360  372  461  282
Source:  Own computation  from 2000 World Bank/University  of Wisconsin survey.
Notes:  IUS$=12.3  C$ in 2000
A househo]d was defined to participate  in church activity  if this was reported  for at least one member of the household.
Agricultural profits are defined as the difference between the total  value of production and  total costs for the entire year (** explain).
Non-agricultural profits are defined similarly for activities in commerce,  service,  small industry, handcrafts,  and food processing.
Agricultural  wages correspond to earnings in money or kind received for activities  outside the farm.
Non-earned income  includes income  from remittances,  interest, and pensions.
The  value of assets in the portfolio are self reported for a large number of categories (**  give for both agricultural and non-
agricultural).
Non agricultural  enterprise assets  corresponds to facilities located in urban areas
23Table 2: Land access and production structure by group in 2000
Total Sample  Established  Land scarce  Titling prog.  Land buyers
Producers  households  Participants
Land access,  production structure, and productivity
Operated area (Mzs.)  47.98  58.14  3.17  27.03  92.33
Owned area (Mzs.)  46.65  57.07  2.20  26.90  87.32
of which cultivated  (Mzs.)  13.45  16.26  1.43  15.10  13.02
of which pasture  (Mzs.)  27.24  33.95  0.52  7.16  62.97
of which other uses (Mzs.)  5.97  6.86  0.26  4.64  11.34
Producers renting in  19.1%  14.4%  39.2%  14.8%  22.3%
Producers renting out  7.9%  9.9%  0.8%  7.6%  8.5%
Profit per mz. (median)  C$  310.49  357.11  522.75  190.50  282.47
Titling status and type of document
No document  3.4%  2.4%  5.4%  4.4%  5.5%
Informal document  11.1%  10.5%  10.8%  7.9%  20.0%
Registered document  63.0%  78.3%  70.3%  16.2%  64.3%
Agrarian reform title  33.7%  17.8%  14.9%  87.7%  26.7%
Document individual  95.0%  98.3%  96.2%  83.6%  98.5%
Document mancomunado  6.0%  1.8%  3.8%  18.6%  5.1%
Title joint  4.9%  1.7%  2.7%  15.1%  3.9%
Source:  Own  computation from 2000 World Bank/University of Wisconsin survey.
Notes:  The types of document may sum up to more than 100%  due to ownership of multiple plots within the same household.
IUS$=12.3  C$ in 2000
I mz. = 0.7 ha
24Table 3: Changes in title status by plot between 1990 and 1996  and 1996 and 1999, respectively
Between  1990 and 1996
Document held in 1990
Document held in 1996  None  Unofficial  Agrarian  Full registration  Total  Percentage
Document  Reform Title
None  31  1  2  3  37  2.1%
Unofficial Doc.  22  92  21  11  146  8.3%
Agrarian Reform Title  170  91  139  19  419  23.9%
Full registration  13  97  44  996  1150  65.6%
Total  236  281  206  1029  1752  100.0%
Percentage  13.5%  16.0%  11.8%  58.7%  100.0%
Between  1996 and 1999
Document held in 1996
Document held in 1999  None  Unofficial  Agrarian  Full registration  Total  Percentage
Document  Reform Title
None  36  1  3  4  44  1.9%
Unofficial  Doc.  36  116  31  15  198  8.4%
Agrarian Reform Title  324  121  220  25  690  29.2%
Full registration  19  109  82  1222  1432  60.6%
Total  415  347  336  1266  2364  100.0%
Percentage  17.6%  14.7%  14.2%  53.6%  100%
Source:  Own computation  from 2000 World Bank/University  of Wisconsin survey.
Note:  The number of observations included  in each of the transition matrices is lower than the total number of plots (3649) because changes
are observed only for plots that had been held already in the initial period (i.e.  1990 or 1996). **  give the number of plots in each of
the cases.
25Table 4: Reasons given for not obtaining title or registration (in percentages),  total and by sub-sample of producers
Plots that have no title
Total Sample  Established  Land scarce  Titling prog.  Land buyers
Producers  Households  Participants
Don't know how to get  0.92 (%)  0.66(%)  --  0.56(%)  1.87(%)
Not worth the effort  90.37(%)  91.41(%)  92.59(%)  93.85(%)  84.58(%)
Worth it but lack the resources/time  7.21(%)  6.17(%)  3.7(%)  5.03(%)  1 .68(%)
Other reasons  1.60(%)  1.76(%)  3.70(%)  0.56(%)  1.87(%)
No. of Observations (plots)  874  454  27  179  214
Plots that  are not registered
Total Sample  Established  Land scarce  Titling prog.  Land buyers
Producers  households  Participants
Don't know how to get  7.34(%)  4.93(%)  7.69(%)  13.61(%)  7.05(%)
Not worth the effort  5.29(%)  5.21(%)  7.69(%)  4.08(%)  6.41(%)
Lack the resources/time  69.45(%)  73.43(%)  84.61(%)  74.15(%)  54.48(%)
Other (incl. no title)  17.92(%)  16.44(%)  --  8.16(%)  32.05(%)
No. of Observations  (plots)  681  365  13  147  156
Source:  Own computation  from 2000 World Bank/University of Wisconsin survey.
26Table 5: Probability  of having made land-attached investments  between 1990 and 1999
Model
Probit  Tobit
Area (mzs.)  0.001***  69.1***
(5.60)  (7.9)
Area squared  -0.0000002***  -0.02***
(3.44)  (4.3)
Length of possession (years)  -0.001  -66.9
(1.56)  (1.0)
Received agrarian reform  title after 1990  0.028  1766.6
(1.18)  (1.2)
Plot was registered before  1990  0.039*  2860.3*
(1.84)  (1.8)
Plot was registered after  1990  0.088***  7460.1***
(4.55)  (5.2)
Plot under perennials  0.025  4290.2*
(0.88)  (2.1)
Plot under pasture  0.002  -317.3
(0.13)  (0.2)
Plot under forest  -0.141***  -13457.5***
(3.10)  (2.58)
Plot under fallow  -0.122***  -12308.1***
(2.71)  (2.5)
House plot  0.080**  5455.8***
(2.33)  (2.3)
Plot undulating  0.046**  4220.5***
(2.51)  (3.1)
Plot hilly  0.022  1462.5
(1.19)  (1.0)
Plot steep  0.052  3564.6
(1.58)  (1.5)
Log likelihood  -1454.76  -7696.6
Pseudo R2  0.0710  0.01
No. of observations  (plots)  3217  3200
Source:  Own computation from 2000 World Bank/University  of Wisconsin  survey.
Notes:  Dependent variables are a dummy variables  for whether  or not investment had been made during the period for the Probit model and
the value of the land attached investment for the Tobit model.
*** significant  at 1%; **  significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
For Probit model:  coefficients correspond to marginal probabilities at the mean values
For Tobit model:  coefficients correspond to marginal effects for C$ invested
Robust z-statistics in parentheses  for Probit,  t-statistics for Tobit
Omitted categories  are no document for type of title;  plot under annuals for current use of plot;  and flat for plot topography.
Regional dummies  included but not reported.
27Table 6: Pseudo-profit Function
Estimated Parameter
Value of land attached instalations in 1999  (log)  0.287***
(3.49)
Value of assets in 1997  (log)  0.028***
(3.28)
Total Livestock value  (log)  0.118***
(16.10)
Level of Education  (years completed)  2487.3***
(4.92)




Number of observations  1937
R-squared  0.26
Source:  Own  cormputation from 2000 World Bank/University  of Wisconsin  survey.
Notes:  Dependent  variables are profits in C$
***  significant at 1%; **  significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
Absolute value of robust t -statistics in parentheses.
28Table 7: Land price regressions  at the plot level  with and without household  fixed  effects
Technique
Ordinary Least Squares  Random effects  Household fixed effects
Area  0.011 ***  0.009***  0.007***
(18.91)  (17.76)  (10.38)
Area squared  -0.000001***  -0.0000002***  -0.0000003***
(12.39)  (12.00)  (7.19)
Value  of improvements  (log)  0.061***  0.047***  0.023***
(9.00)  (7.83)  (2.97)
Length of possession in years  0.004*  0.005**  0.013***
(1.68)  (2.08)  (3.31)
Plot is registered  0.372***  0.331***  0.294***
(5.80)  (5.31)  (3.21)
Plot has been purchased  0.001  0.104  0.281 ***
(0.01)  (1.51)  (2.68)
Plot has been  occupied  0.048  0.085  0.119
(0.35)  (0.62)  (0.55)
Plot acquired through ag.  Reform  0.293  0.209  -0.531
before  1990  (0.98)  (0.70)  (1.02)
Plot acquired through ag.  Reform  0.040  0.201*  0.442**
after  1990  (0.37)  (1.86)  (2.44)
Pre-1990 agrarian reform and  -0.532*  -0.204  1.107**
agr. Reform title  (1.70)  (0.65)  (2.05)
Plot is undulating  0.168**  0.127*  0.139
(2.38)  (1.78)  (1.25)
Plot is hilly  0.071  0.064  0.216+
(0.97)  (0.84)  (1.69)
Plot is steep  -0.109  -0.161  -0.031
(0.91)  (1.30)  (0.15)
Plot used for perennials  0.538***  0.392***  0.004
(4.80)  (3.65)  (0.03)
Plot used for pasture  0.436***  0.368***  0.128
(6.44)  (5.68)  (1.43)
Plot used for forest  -0.008  0.109  0.131
(0.04)  (0.67)  (0.71)
Plot is in fallow  -0.288  -0.335**  -0.614***
(1.61)  (2.00)  (2.62)
House plot  -0.635***  -0.580***  -0.388**
(4.60)  (4.78)  (2.46)
Constant  8.964***  9.042***  8.989***
(93.18)  (92.79)  (63.08)
Number of observations  3062  3062  3062
R-squared  0.26  0.20  0.17
Number of households  1926  1926  1926
Source:  Own computation from 2000 World Bank/University  of Wisconsin  survey.
Notes:  Dependent variables  is the self-reported selling price of the land in C5
*** significant at  1%; **  significant at 5%; *  significant  at 10%
Region dummies  included but not reported.  Absolute value of robust  t-statistics in parentheses.
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